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Maltese Alkagesta traded smuggled Libyan oil with Azerbaijani beneficiaries to circumvent sanctions and financed armed groups

• 20.08.2025 08:47

Fuel smuggling from Libya is a multi-billion dollar business, but very little is known about the true scale of the maritime operations that systematically export petroleum products from the country.

An investigation by Lloyd’s List  found  42 tankers that had made at least 195 voyages to the old port of Benghazi in the past two years - the equivalent of 1.4 million deadweight tons.

Satellite images analyzed by Lloyd’s List during the investigation show a regular turnover of ships, including large tankers, in the old port of Benghazi. 

This suggests that the actual number of vessel movements is even higher and the tanker network is more extensive than assumed, as some vessels operate outside of their usual concealment patterns, making them even more difficult to track. 

A Bloomberg annual investigation showed that in 2022, up to 40% of fuel produced domestically and imported under a subsidy program (about $5 billion per year) was diverted to the shadow trade.

Benghazi has become a hotspot for maritime smuggling in the past few years.

The exploitation of gas oil in Libya has been a problem for over a decade: smugglers take advantage of the government’s fuel subsidy program to sell it on the black market for profit.

Read on the topic: They tried to take 11 million hryvnias worth of precious metals out of Ukraine

Benghazi is a key trading port in eastern Libya, and in its northern part, on the east coast, is the old port (marked in the graphic below).

“When the EU launched operations Sophia and then Irene to limit illicit flows linked to Libya, while encouraging some Libyan armed groups to combat these flows instead of exploiting them, fuel smuggling from Libya’s west coast slowed down,” the article notes. 

The decline in fuel smuggling from Libya’s western coast has likely opened up opportunities for such schemes to become more active in the east of the country.

The Government of National Unity (GNU) is the UN-recognized government of Libya.

The Libyan Arab Army (LAAF), led by Khalifa Haftar and the Wagner Group, includes both former Gaddafi-era soldiers and informal militias. It positions itself as a national army, a status contested by the internationally recognized government.

The LAAF likely receives additional revenue from illegal fuel smuggling going east.

“LAAF dominates the public life of eastern Libya,” explains Janes senior analyst James Trigg.

"It is believed that any activity taking place in eastern Libya most likely has (unofficial) authorization from the Haftar family, the Russian Wagner Group, and the LAAF command."

Some UN experts confirmed in their 2023 report that maritime fuel smuggling from the Zawiya and Zuwara areas in western Libya continues.

Schemes of the operation of the maritime fuel smuggling network.

Read on the topic: Lviv Cosa Nostra: Vasyl Kostyuk and his mafia of envelopes and smuggling

The UN Expert Scheme identified three main methods (modi operandi) used by fuel smuggling networks:

1. The ships are loaded in Benghazi, then sail into international waters, especially east of Malta, where fuel is transshipped.
2. The ships are loaded in Benghazi, then sent directly to the next destination, where they are unloaded under forged export certificates.
3. The ships are loaded in another country, but not completely, then call at Benghazi, where they are reloaded to full or overcapacity, and then proceed to the port of destination.

Lloyd’s List conducted an analysis of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) gaps that were opened and closed within a defined area covering the entire Libyan coast, as well as parts of Egypt, Malta and the island of Crete. These gaps were analyzed, and those that matched the pattern described by the UN panel were counted as likely voyages to the old port of Benghazi. Cases where the vessel could not physically reach Benghazi during the "silence" period, as well as those that did not fit the smuggling profile, were excluded. Only tankers carrying petroleum products or bunkers were considered.

Lloyd’s List classifies a tanker as part of the "dark fleet" if it:

• over 15 years old;
• is owned by an anonymous owner and/or has a corporate structure that makes it difficult to establish the ultimate beneficiary;
• involved exclusively in the transportation of sanctioned oil;
• uses one or more of the fraud schemes described in the US Department of State’s guidance from May 2020.

The statistics did not include tankers owned by state entities, such as Russia’s Sovcomflot or Iran’s NITC, as well as vessels already under sanctions.

From January 2023 to August 2024, Lloyd’s List identified 42 tankers that made voyages that matched the patterns described above. This includes both tracked and "dark" activities.

Alkagesta  is a company registered in Malta and formally founded by two Azerbaijani citizens: Kamran Aghayev, with addresses in Azerbaijan and Dubai, and Orkhan Rustamov. Alkagesta was one of the companies involved in the transportation of Libyan oil. 

We will issue separate investigative reports dedicated to the professional activities of each of these individuals. 

Alkagesta  is  an international  trading company registered in Malta, with subsidiaries  in  the UK, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE and Singapore.

Currently, the board of directors of Alkagesta includes:

• Mark Seccombe
• Kamran Aghayev
• Orkhan Rustamov
• Pierre Marie Christian Gay

We received a number of financial documents related to the activities of the Alkagesta company, as well as very interesting information indicating the possible involvement of this structure in illegal oil transactions.

In particular, this concerns the voyage of the MT TONY vessel, which on November 4, 2022, submitted a customs declaration to the Turkish port of Gebze Poliport for the unloading of 2,482,732 liters of gasoline, allegedly loaded from the territory of Malta. According to the declaration, the seller of the fuel was Alkagesta Ltd. Malta, and the recipient was Alkagesta Ltd Mersin (Turkey). At the same time, the same documents indicate that the port of shipment is Malta, and the country of origin of the goods is Turkmenistan, which in itself causes obvious contradictions.

In addition, the declaration lists Alkagesta Malta as the recipient, while the invoice lists Alkagesta Mersin. The place of loading is also in dispute. The declaration lists Malta, but the ship’s captain’s documents and the invoice list OPL (out of port limits), a term that means loading outside the official port area, i.e. in a roadstead or in international waters. This practice is typical of schemes involving illegal fuel transhipments, often used to conceal the real origin of the products.

It is worth mentioning separately that the forwarder indicates Malta Freeport Destripark as the port of loading, which is located within the territorial waters of Malta, but specializes mainly in container transportation and is not intended for loading bulk cargo. This further casts doubt on the authenticity of the documents. At the same time, the declaration indicates Malta as the country of origin, and the invoice indicates Turkmenistan. There is no document confirming the products - there are no signatures, seals, names of responsible persons or companies, there is no surveyor’s report on loading. The absence of such documents, according to international trade rules, grossly violates the procedure for confirming the origin of the cargo.

All these circumstances taken together — contradictory data about the seller and recipient, fictitious port instructions, lack of documentation — directly indicate mechanisms for legalizing fuel of unknown origin. We may be talking about an attempt to hide the true route and nature of the delivery, including to circumvent international sanctions.

Second supply

On November 24, 2022, the vessel MT ISTRA submitted a customs declaration for the unloading of 3,279,975 liters of gasoline, allegedly loaded in Malta and delivered to the Turkish port of Gebze Poliport.

According to the declaration, the seller is Alkagesta LTD Malta, the buyer is Alkagesta LTD Mersin, and the port of loading and country of manufacture are Malta. The origin of the fuel is indicated as Turkmenistan. However, there are again discrepancies in the invoice: the recipient of the fuel in this document is not Mersin, but Alkagesta Malta, which contradicts the information in the declaration.

In addition, despite the fact that the declaration indicates Malta as the port of loading, the master’s documents and the invoice refer to OPL (out of port limits) - loading outside the waters of the official port. This is a typical wording used in cases where fuel is transshipped in international waters, without official recording in the port logs. The shipping agency again indicates Malta Freeport Destripark as the port of loading, although this terminal specializes in containers and does not actually serve bulk vessels.

Additional discrepancies concern the country of origin: the declaration indicates Malta, the invoice - Turkmenistan. At the same time, there are no documents confirming the origin and shipment of the fuel: there are no seals, no signatures, no names of responsible persons or companies, no surveyors’ reports.

As with the MT TONY, this is a clear example of documentary manipulation aimed at legalizing fuel of dubious origin. It is clear that this is a systematic scheme in which Alkagesta is involved in transshipments outside ports and falsification of the origin of the oil, using fictitious routes and contradictory documentation to conceal the real source and nature of the goods.

Third delivery

On December 10, 2022, the MT TONY vessel again submitted a customs declaration for the unloading of 2,777,744 liters of gas condensate, allegedly loaded from the territory of Malta and sent to the Turkish port of Gebze Poliport.

This declaration lists Alkagesta LTD Malta as the seller, and Alkagesta Mersin as the buyer. The port of shipment and country of manufacture are Malta, while the origin of the fuel is again Turkmenistan. However, as in previous cases, the documents contain obvious contradictions: the declaration lists Alkagesta Mersin as the recipient, while the invoice lists Alkagesta Malta.

Further, although the declaration indicates Malta as the port of shipment, the invoice and all captain’s documents refer to OPL (outside port limits), i.e. loading outside the official port, probably on the high seas. As before, the forwarder calls the port of loading Malta Freeport Destripark, which, as we recall, is a container terminal and does not serve bulk vessels, which makes such information unreliable.

The country of origin of the product is again different: the declaration indicates Malta, the invoice - Turkmenistan. At the same time, as in previous flights, there are no documents that could confirm the authenticity of the declared origin and place of loading: there are no seals, signatures, details of responsible persons or companies, there is no surveyor’s report.

Thus, this shipment fits into an already established pattern: fictitious documentation, duplicate and dummy parties to the transaction, conflicting information about the port and country of origin, and loading outside official ports. All these elements point to a systemic scheme for laundering the origin and legalization of fuel with potentially sanctioned or illegal status, in which Alkagesta plays a key role. 

According to sources investigating the activities of Alkagesta, an oil trader based in Malta, the company has recently become one of the most active participants in the trading of petroleum products on the island. As The Maltese Herald has learned, Alkagesta leases the Evos oil bunkering base, located next to Freeport, as well as other oil storage facilities in Malta, including facilities in Delimar.

The company is accused of buying Libyan oil and reselling it with forged certificates of origin. According to sources, Alkagesta’s Maltese offices employ Russian-speaking employees, which may also indicate certain connections with the post-Soviet space. The practice of purchasing smuggled oil off the coast of Libya - including in the Hurd’s Bank area and in Malta itself - with subsequent resale under false documents was the subject of a separate investigation by the UN Security Council.

The Maltese oil market is also home to major international traders such as Macquarie Commodities, Peninsula Petroleum and BB Energy, which have the infrastructure to handle large volumes of fuel. However, our sources say it is Alkagesta that is now actively outpacing its competitors, strengthening its presence and expanding its trading footprint.

The European Union, the United Nations, the United States and the United Kingdom should urgently review the situation related to the activities of the Alkagesta company. In this case, there were violations of UN resolutions, as well as non-compliance with sanctions legislation. Ignoring these facts undermines the effectiveness of the international sanctions regime and sets a dangerous precedent for further trade in oil from conflict zones, bypassing legal and ethical norms.

The Liberian tanker Hamsi, which is unloading smuggled Libyan oil for the Maltese company Falzon & Falzon, does not call at Turkey to load fuel. Instead, the vessel regularly loads in Tobruk, Libya, and then heads to Turkey solely to obtain fictitious certificates of origin, passing off Libyan oil as products of a different origin—usually Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. These forged certificates are then passed on to the final buyer, in this case the Maltese company Falzon & Falzon. The Tobruk-Turkey-Malta route has become regular, and Falzon & Falzon is the largest customer of the Hamsi tanker in Malta.

The activity of Alkagesta Ltd, which, according to Volza, acts as an importer through terminals on the Black Sea, deserves special attention:

• Alkagesta Ltd In Yomkostyah Black Sea Terminal Po Poruch. Enym DMCC — registered in Batumi (listed as being in Turkey, which is probably due to logistical misunderstandings, but it is Georgia). The company made 14 deliveries from 2 suppliers, the main source of which is Kazakhstan. The imported goods were classified under HSN code 2710 — petroleum products. The main suppliers — LLP Kyzylorda Refinery and Kyzylordinsky Low Tonnage LLP.
• Alkagesta Ltd And Black Sea Terminal Facilities — registered in Khobi, Turkey, with 20 deliveries from 7 suppliers. The source of supplies is again Kazakhstan, and among the main suppliers are Amangeldinskiy GPZ Limited, Amangeldinsky GPZ Ltd. and Amangeldinskiy GPZ LLP. The imported products were M-100 fuel oil, produced at the Kyzylorda Refinery.

Thus, a stable scheme is emerging, in which Libyan oil is loaded in Tobruk, then registered as Kazakh oil using forged Turkish certificates, and then sold in the EU via Malta. Alkagesta acts as a logistical and legal intermediary, using terminals in Batumi, Khobi and Maltese infrastructure.

This confirms the need for an international legal response, as it concerns the systematic circumvention of sanctions, violation of UN resolutions, as well as the falsification of the origin of energy resources, which is directly related to the shadow economy and the financing of armed groups, including groups under sanctions.

 

Product	Supplier	Origin	Quantity.
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MECHANICAL PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- 0.2; View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	255.746 N/A
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MEHANICHESKIH PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- 0 View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	195.256 N/A
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MEHANICHESKIH PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- 0 View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	66.96 N/A
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MEHANICHESKIH PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- 0 View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	195.518 N/A
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MEHANICHESKIH PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- 0 View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	194.412 N/A
KINEMATIC VISCOSITY (GOST 33-2016/ ASTM D 445-2011), MM2/C: PRI TEMPERATURE 50 C- ; PRI TEMPERATURE 100С- 13.2; ALCOHOL (GOST 1461-75), % – 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA MECHANICHESKIH PRIMESEY (GOST 6370-2018), %- 0.05; MASSOVAYA DOLYA VODY (GOST 2477-2014), %- View Complete Bill of Lading	Key Contacts Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	324.441 N/A

 

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Maltese Alkagesta traded smuggled Libyan oil with Azerbaijani beneficiaries, circumventing UN and EU sanctions

 

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Some representatives of the current management of  Alkagesta LTD :

Asad Huseynov
Location: United Kingdom
Position:

Since 2024 — Managing Director of Investments and Asset Management, Alkagesta LTD

2022–2024 — Vice President, Energy Investment Banking, Barclays Corporate & Investment Bank

Farid Mammadli
Location: Dublin, Ireland
Position:

Since 2021 — Business Development Manager, Alkagesta LTD

2018–2021 — Data and Business Analytics Manager, Ante Technologies LLC

2017–2018 — Head of Derivatives Department, Alkagesta LTD

Nagabhushan Kadamati
Location: Andhra Pradesh, India
Position:

Since 2023 — Operations Specialist, Alkagesta LTD

2018–2024 — Commercial Transportation and Logistics Manager, Coromandel International Limited

Nazim Huseynov
Location: Geneva, Switzerland
Position:

Since 2023 — Chartering Manager, Alkagesta LTD

2022–2023 — Chartering Manager, SET SELECT ENERGY GMBH

2019–2023 — Chartering and Operations Specialist, SET SELECT ENERGY GMBH

Vusal Muradov
Location: Dubai, UAE
Position:

Since 2023 — Head of Fertilizer Trade Department, Alkagesta LTD

2020–2022 — Fertilizer Trader, Alkagesta LTD

2019–2020 — Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), Gilan Holding